Bangladesh Crisis: Is the US Backing Islamists Ahead of Crucial Polls? What It Means for India
The United States’ reported outreach to ahead of Bangladesh’s February 2026 elections has triggered sharp geopolitical questions in South Asia, particularly for India. A report by The Washington Post revealed that US embassy officials in Dhaka recently met Jamaat leaders at the party’s Sylhet regional office, part of what appears to be a broader engagement strategy with Islamist groups as Bangladesh heads into a high-stakes vote.
The disclosure comes at a sensitive time, with Bangladesh undergoing political upheaval following the ouster of former prime minister , whose government was long considered New Delhi’s closest ally in Dhaka.
US Outreach to Jamaat-e-Islami
According to the report, a US diplomat was quoted as saying, “We want them to be our friends,” during an interaction with local journalists. While the later clarified that it does not support any particular political party, the pattern of engagement has raised eyebrows.
Over the past two years, US contacts with Jamaat-e-Islami have steadily increased. These include meetings between senior US diplomats and Jamaat leaders in 2023, visits by former US ambassadors to Jamaat headquarters in 2025, and discussions on governance and minority rights hosted at the US embassy. Jamaat chief was also granted a US visa in late 2025 despite past extremist remarks, signalling Washington’s willingness to keep channels open.
Bangladesh’s Shifting Political Landscape
With the effectively sidelined and Hasina currently in India, Bangladesh’s electoral battlefield is expected to be dominated by three forces: the , Jamaat-e-Islami, and the relatively new , which emerged from the 2024 student movement.
Each of these players presents a different challenge for India. Jamaat’s historical opposition to Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation and its ideological hostility toward India make it a particularly worrying prospect for New Delhi. A BNP-led government could be cooler but pragmatic, while the NCP remains unpredictable and has taken a sharper tone on sovereignty and foreign influence.
Why India Is Concerned
India’s anxieties extend beyond diplomatic discomfort. Recent months have seen a rise in attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus, coinciding with growing anti-India rhetoric. New Delhi fears that any government reliant on Islamist support could dilute cooperation on counterterrorism, border security, and regional connectivity, while potentially opening doors to deeper engagement with China or Pakistan.
Complicating matters further, Dhaka has formally demanded the extradition of Sheikh Hasina from India, while visa services between the two countries have faced disruptions amid security concerns. Hasina, speaking from India, has accused the interim administration under of emboldening extremist forces and weakening ties with New Delhi.
Our Thoughts
From India’s perspective, the US engagement with Jamaat-e-Islami reflects Washington’s familiar pattern of prioritising short-term political access over long-term regional stability. While the US maintains that it is merely engaging with all stakeholders, legitimising an Islamist party with a documented anti-India and anti-secular record carries consequences that extend far beyond Bangladesh’s borders.
For New Delhi, the erosion of pro-India political space in Dhaka is not just a diplomatic setback but a strategic concern. India’s neighbourhood policy has long relied on stable, cooperative governments in South Asia. If Bangladesh’s next leadership is shaped by forces sceptical of India, bilateral ties could enter a prolonged period of friction.
Ultimately, India may have to recalibrate its Bangladesh strategy—focusing less on personalities and more on institutional engagement, economic leverage, and regional alliances—to safeguard its interests in an increasingly uncertain political landscape.
